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Stealing What’s Free:  Exploring Compensation to Body Parts Sources for Their Contribution to 
Profitable Biomedical Research1
Introduction
The great tragedy of Science—the slaying of a beautiful 
hypothesis by an ugly fact.  
–T.H. Huxley, Biogenesis and Abiogenesis
At first blush, body parts donated in the name of science appears to be the beautiful 
solution to the problem of scarce body parts for research advancements.  But a closer 
investigation reveals an ugly fact:  the philanthropic donors—referred to as “Sources” in this 
article—are subjected to physical and financial exploitation.  
Sources play a crucial and indispensable role in biotechnology.  Without human body 
parts, most medical discoveries would not have been possible.  Handsome profits can be derived 
from successful discoveries.  But currently in the United States, when a Source provides body 
parts for research purposes, the researcher, research foundation, and outside investors are only a 
few of the parties who may claim a financial stake in the profits of this research.  The Source is 
the only party who is excluded from being financially compensated for his contribution.2
Despite being key player for ground-breaking medical discoveries, legal and political rhetoric 
block Sources from rightful compensation.  
In this article, “Source compensation” will refer to a proportionate share of the research 
profits set aside for the Source as a result of his contribution.  Today, Source compensation is 
prohibited.  Laws are slow in reacting to technological change and resulting societal needs.  The 
progress of Source compensation is hampered by stubborn, archaic attitudes about the value of 
the human body.  However, this article will address the subtle movements in the law toward 
1
  Many thanks to Professor Elizabeth A. Rowe, for her insight, input, and intuition.
2
  John A. Sten, Comment, Rethinking the National Organ Transplant Program:  When Push Comes to Shove, 11 J. 
Contemp. Health & Pol’y 197, 200 (1994).
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Source compensation and the Constitutional soundness of this practice.  Furthermore, public 
policy discussions, ethical implications, and comparisons with other socially embraced practices 
will highlight variations on Source compensation are already prevalent in society, and 
demonstrate that the concept is not so foreign after all.
The Uphill Battle:  Source Compensation and the Law
The Common Law Analysis
History
“The law marches with medicine, but in the rear and limping a little.”3  This reflection 
illustrates a struggle to move forward in unison, due to a judicial system that is slow to resolve 
issues compared with the swift developments made in biotechnology.  The law lags behind for a 
number of reasons.  First, unlike areas such as tort law or commercial law, there is no field of 
law specifically focused on human biological materials or medical advances.4  Instead, 
biotechnology and medical lawsuits rely upon a mosaic of related fields.  Second, common law 
waits for an issue to ripen and for parties to gain standing before reflecting upon past injuries, 
and many issues in biotechnology introduce possibilities that have never before even been 
imagined.  Third, it is entirely possible that biotechnology disputes could be rendered moot by 
the time the issues are resolved, due to the time disparity between the lengthy legal process 
compared to the speed at which the latest medical findings become obsolete.  While common 
law must be credited with gaining some ground in biotechnology, its journey in the direction 
toward Source compensation is just beginning.
3
   Symposium, Medical Science, Moral Controversy, & Legal Change, 64 Neb. L. Rev. 548 (1985).
4
   U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, New Developments in Biotechnology:  Ownership of Human 
Tissues and Cells—Special Report, OTA-BA-337, at Ch.1 pg. 9 (Washington, DC:  U.S. Government Printing 
Office, March 1987).
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The following case studies illustrate three issues central to the debate over Source 
compensation:  1) informed consent, 2) profit potentials concealed from Sources, and 3) personal 
autonomy in body parts.
The “Informed Consent” Hurdle
The catalyst initiating any medical procedure is informed consent.  A physician has the 
expertise essential in evaluating risks and benefits of proceeding or abstaining from treatment.  
In contrast, while lacking medical expertise, the patient has the prerogative to determine the 
course of treatment, if any.5  That is, the patient has a “right of self-decision” when consenting to 
treatment.6  It is the physician’s duty to disclose all material information, such that the patient is 
empowered to make an intelligent decision regarding his own health.7  Thus, the patient has a 
blind trust for his physician, by virtue of medical knowledge, which gives rise to a fiduciary 
physician-patient relationship.8  An accepted standard for measuring the adequacy of the 
informed consent is the objective test:  whether a prudent person in the same situation, who had 
been informed of all relevant risks and benefits, would have done as the patient did.9
Traditionally, informed consent referred only to medical treatment.  However, the 
landmark case of Moore v. Regents of the University of California extends the definition to 
require that physicians “disclose personal interests unrelated to the patient’s health, whether 
research or economic, that may affect [the physician’s] judgment.”10  Yet, despite demanding a 
patient’s informed consent, Moore illustrated the judiciary’s reluctance to compensate a Source 
for a contribution which ultimately yielded tremendous profits.  
5
   Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 242 (Cal. 1972)
6 Id. at 245.
7 Id. at 243.
8
   Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990).
9
   Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
10 Moore, 793 P.2d at 485.
- 5 -
John Moore of California was diagnosed with leukemia in 1976.  His physician, Dr. 
Golde, told Moore that his life depended on a splenectomy.11  For seven years, Moore continued 
to receive Golde’s treatments, including numerous extractions of blood, tissue, and body fluids.  
Golde insisted that these procedures were “necessary and required for [Moore’s] health and well-
being, and [Moore continued these visits] based upon the trust inherent in and by virtue of the 
physician-patient relationship.”12  Unbeknownst to Moore, these “treatments” had no 
relationship to treating his condition.  Instead, Golde and his associates had an ulterior motive 
for collecting the body parts:  Moore’s cells had very rare qualities with enormous financial 
potential.  These researchers secured for themselves the exclusive and unlimited access to these 
cells by exploiting Moore’s fiduciary physician-patient relationship with Golde.  The fruits of 
Golde’s research yielded a patent on a cell line derived from Moore’s body parts.  Moore was 
not informed of his role in the development of this profitable, cutting-edge product, much less 
compensated for such.  Ultimately, the patented cell line earned over $440,000 and 75,000 shares 
of common stock in a biotechnology company for Golde and his associates.13
Because Moore had no property rights to his body parts under the law, the court refused 
to recognize his conversion claim as actionable.14  Thus, while the Moore court recognized that 
Golde breached a fiduciary duty to Moore by failing to provide informed consent regarding the 
purpose of performing the extractions, the court refused to offer Moore any financial redress.15
This holding has a significant impact in the progress of biotechnology.  No longer can 
physicians abuse their position of trust to remove body parts—under the guise of providing 
treatment—to fulfill their own scientific purposes.  Sources must be provided with all material 
11
     Surgical procedure where the spleen is removed.
12 Moore, at 481.
13 Id. at 482.
14 Id. at 497.
15 Id. at 485, 497.
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information regarding the fate of their body parts, and then choose to give informed consent to 
have their body parts used for those limited purposes.16  Furthermore, the scientist’s full 
disclosure gives Sources an opportunity to learn about the value of their bodies, and the 
significance of their impact on biotechnology.  Appreciation of their own bargaining power is 
the first step in Source compensation.
Nonetheless, Moore’s informed consent still has loopholes.  Most significant is that a 
researcher needs only disclose that he intends to perform experiments on the Source’s body 
parts,17 not that the research product could yield financial profit.  Thus, while the Source is 
empowered with the present value of his body, he is still ignorant of the potential value, and 
blind to the possible wealth a few of his cells may earn for the researcher.  Furthermore, despite 
other jurisdictions’ support of Moore,18 courts in other jurisdictions continue to take steps 
backward since the Moore decision, dismissing Sources’ attempts to integrate research intentions 
into informed consent.19
The “Fraudulent Concealment” Hurdle
While withholding medical knowledge constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty, 
withholding financial knowledge as it pertains to the profits of research can constitute fraudulent 
concealment.  However, as evidenced in Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital Research 
Institute, Inc.,20 to state an enforceable fraudulent concealment action, there are specific 
standards to overcome.  
16 Id. at 497.
17 Id.
18 See, e.g., Grimes v. Kennedy Grieger Inst., 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001); In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. 
Supp. 796 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
19 See, e.g.,  Hecht v. Kaplan, 221 A.D.2d 100 (N.Y. App. Div., 1996).
20
   Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1067 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
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In Greenberg, eight Florida parents had children suffering from Canavan disease, a rare 
and fatal hereditary disorder.  They sought Dr. Matalon to discover the genetic cause.  The 
parents provided Matalon with blood and tissue samples “for the specific purpose of researching 
Canavan disease,” with the understanding that “Matalon’s research would remain in the public 
domain to promote the discovery of more effective prevention techniques and treatments and, 
eventually, to effectuate a cure.”21  By 1993, Matalon and his associates identified the gene 
responsible for Canavan disease.22  In 1997, Matalon patented his work, granting him exclusive 
access to the Canavan gene and all its related testing, therapy, and research.23  The parents did 
not learn of the patent until 1998, after Matalon had already received over $75,000 in royalties.24
Fraudulent concealment is actionable under Florida law.  The court reasoned that 
fraudulent concealment is enforceable only when heightened standards are satisfied.25
Specifically, not only does the Source bear the burden of proving the elements,26 but the Source 
must also state the circumstances of the fraud with particularity according to Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); 
that is, the “who, what, when, where, and how.”27  Thus, although the parents argued that they 
would not have made their contributions if Matalon disclosed his intent to commercialize their 
body parts for his own financial benefit, the Greenberg court refused to recognize their 
fraudulent concealment action because the parents could not satisfy the heightened threshold.28
21 Id. at 1067.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 1067-68.
25 Id.
26
   Jones v. General Motors Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1339 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (defining fraudulent concealment as 
a misrepresentation of a material fact or suppression of the truth that induced detrimental reliance, and the fact was 
one which the representor a) knew was false, b) was unsure whether the fact is true or false, or c) ought to have 
known was false).
27
   DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990).
28 Greenberg, 264 F.Supp. 2d. at 1074.
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Greenberg places an unreasonable burden upon the Source.  The Source is already at a 
disadvantage due to the lack of scientific education, as recognized by jurisdictions demanding 
informed consent.  Fraudulent concealment in the biotechnology context is different from other 
fraudulent claims in that the researcher may be the only one with the specific, technical 
knowledge to understand the particulars of the fraud.  This unreasonably high threshold sets a 
dangerous precedent:  a scientist may intentionally withhold disclosure of his use of body parts 
for his own financial gain, despite knowledge of the Sources’ wishes to the contrary, and the 
court will dismiss the fraudulent concealment claim.29
The “Autonomy Over One’s Body” Hurdle
The fraudulent concealment claim is not the only carrot on a stick for Sources; other 
potential claims can be just as difficult to justify.  For example, in some states, Sources cannot 
argue unjust enrichment, a contractual inequity, because body parts are not formally recognized 
as property that can be exchanged for consideration.30  In fact, much of the difficulty stems from 
the debate over whether Sources can be granted property rights in their bodies.  While there is no 
distinct area of law focused on human biological materials or medical advances to resolve this 
issue, the other fields of law have successfully argued to provide Sources with relief.  For 
example, in Hecht v. Superior Court,31  the court deferred to property law and estate law to 
determine that sperm should be described as property and allowed its devise according to the 
deceased’s will.  
In Hecht, 48 year-old William Kane wished to bear another child with his girlfriend, 
Deborah Hecht.  In 1991, Kane wrote a letter to be read after his death:
29 Id.
30 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 19(a)-280 (West 1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-289.1 (1985).
31
   Hecht v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 222 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
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I address this to my children, because, although I have only two . . . 
it may be that Deborah will decide—as I hope she will—to have a 
child by me after my death.  I’ve been assiduously generating 
frozen sperm samples for that eventuality.32
Kane died a few weeks after this letter was written, and Hecht sought to become pregnant 
with the sperm left to her.  Kane’s adult children challenged the will, demanding that all 15 vials 
of sperm be destroyed.  They argued that preventing posthumous children is essential to 
preserving the family unit.33  Contrary to overwhelming case law specifically refusing to grant 
property rights to body parts,34 the Hecht court described sperm as “the seed of life . . . tied to the 
fundamental liberty of a human being to conceive or not to conceive….  [T]he fate of the sperm 
must be decided by the person from whom it is drawn.”35  In essence, the court granted Kane a 
power of autonomy over his body parts to devise to whom he chooses, and further granted Hecht 
a limited property right to use the sperm only as Kane intended.
In addition to the progress made towards property recognition in body parts, Hecht is a 
crucial decision for proponents of Source compensation, because it enforces a Source’s right to 
make choices about his body parts:  to whom they would belong, for what purpose they would 
serve, and the circumstances surrounding their destiny.
In the spirit of Hecht, some courts reached as far as treating pre-embryonic cells as 
property in disposition disputes, although not specifically granting “property” status.36  It is 
notable that these cases all deal with reproductive cells, which, by virtue of their potential as “the 
seed of life,”37 have more significant personal value to the Source than other cells or body parts.  
32 Id. at 224.
33
   Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 279 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
34 See, e.g., Moore, 793 P.2d 479; Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064; Miles v. Scripps Clinic & Research Found., 
810 F.Supp. 1091 (S.D. Cal. 1993).
35 Hecht, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
36 See, e.g., Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992); Kass v. Kass, 673 N.Y.S.2d 350 (N.Y. 1998).
37
   Shapiro & Sonnenblick, The Widow and the Sperm:  The Law of Post-Mortem Insemination, 1 J. Law and Health 
229, 232 (1983).
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Accordingly, other body parts with presumably less sentimental attachment, such as skin or 
bone, should likewise be treated as property.  
Seeking “property” status in one’s body is, however, not material to Source 
compensation.  Rather, regardless of property status, Sources should be able to choose the fate of 
their body parts and, as a corollary, be compensated for their choices, if they so decide.
The Statutory Analysis
Because common law authority in biotechnology has been generally uncharted territory, 
legislative enactments have attempted to shape permissible and prohibited activity, albeit in a 
direction away from Source compensation.  Directed at issues regarding exchange of organs for 
transplants or medical research, Congress passed two acts:  the National Organ Transplantation 
Act (NOTA) and the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA).
The National Organ Transplantation Act
In 1984, Congress passed NOTA,38 prohibiting the sale of organs for transplantation 
purposes.39  Specifically, NOTA imposes a $50,000 maximum fine and/or imprisonment up to 
five years for the buying and selling of all human organs “for valuable consideration for use in 
human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce.”40
Although initially enacted to prevent a commercial market for organs,41 where 
movements toward Source compensation are concerned, NOTA is not as difficult an obstacle to 
overcome as the common law has proven to be.  First, NOTA applies only to organs, and makes 
no reference to cells, tissues, or fluids.  Second, NOTA applies only to transplants—no reference 
is made to body parts used for research purposes.  Thus, it is conceivable that financial 
38
   Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (1984) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 201, 273, 274e (Supp. 1994).
39 See 42 U.S.C.S. § 274e(a) (Supp. 1994).
40 Id.
41
   Lloyd R. Cohen, Organ Transplant Market Would Save Lives, Nat’l L.J., Jan. 29, 1996, at A19.
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compensation for human cells, tissues, or fluids for research purposes is permissible under 
NOTA.  However, a third, and a most troubling short-coming of NOTA, is an exception to the 
interstate commerce prohibition.  Organ transplants are not to significantly affect interstate 
commerce; however, this prohibition does not apply to “payments associated with removal, 
transportation, implantation, processing, preservation, quality control, and storage of a human 
organ or the expenses of travel, housing, and lost wages incurred by the donor of a human organ 
in connection with donation of the organ.”42  Essentially, this NOTA exception applies to 
everyone but the Source, meaning that all parties involved in the transaction—even those 
performing medically unrelated tasks—may be financially compensated, except for the Source.  
Regardless of whether legislatures unintentionally left out Sources’ interests, NOTA unfairly 
prevents equitable compensation to Sources for their contributions.
The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
By 1973, UAGA was adopted by all fifty states.43  It provides that an individual of sound 
mind and at least eighteen years of age may donate his organs upon death.44  In 1987, UAGA 
was amended to expressly prohibit the sale or purchase of a body part for transplantation or 
therapy.45  Conceivably, the sale or purchase of body parts could be permissible if done for 
research.  Again, UAGA’s applicability to Source compensation may be limited.  Mainly, since 
Sources would likely be making inter vivos transfers, UAGA would not require body parts to be 
donated.
Thus, while Congress has attempted to alleviate problems between Sources and 
researchers, their enactments need significant updating to meet new research demands.  
42
   42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2) (1994).
43
   Lloyd R. Cohen, supra.
44
   Unif. Anatomical Gift Act §2(a) (amended 1987), 8A U.L.A. 99 (1968).
45
   1987 UAGA § 10(a), 8A U.L.A. 25 (Supp. 1990).
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Currently, Sources have some leeway to interpret NOTA and UAGA as favoring Source 
compensation, as discussed.  However, due to the vagueness of enforceable rights as outlined in 
case law, the legislature must recognize financial disparities between researchers and Sources, 
and protect Sources from this inequity.
The Constitutional Analysis
There is, of course, no specific “right to Source compensation” in the U.S. Constitution.  
However, simply because a right is not expressly enumerated, it does not mean that this right is 
not constitutionally protected.46  As described in the landmark Griswold v. Connecticut, “specific 
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees 
that help give them life and substance.” 47  In other words, while the Constitution specifically 
outlines citizens’ rights, a penumbra is a broadened interpretation of the Constitution applied in 
the context of people’s lives.  It is this penumbra that brings rights to life.  Under the penumbra 
of the Fourth Amendment,48 Griswold identified guaranteed zones of privacy.49  As a 
fundamental liberty, the right to privacy is considered a right implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment50, and is offered the highest 
protection.  
The penumbral right to privacy has been interpreted to mean a right to personal 
autonomy.  Just as the issue in Roe v. Wade51 was not the right to have an abortion, Sources do 
not argue that they have a right to be compensated.  In Roe, a woman successfully challenged a 
statute prohibiting her from having an abortion on grounds that the statute invaded her privacy.
46 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).  
47 Id., (finding unconstitutional a state statute prohibiting a physician from prescribing contraceptives to a married 
woman, as the governmental intrusion encroached on her rights to privacy). 
48
   U.S. Const. amend. XIV (preventing warrantless governmental intrusions upon one’s home and person).
49 Griswold, at 484.
50
   U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
51
   Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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She did not argue her right to have an abortion; instead, she argued that under the penumbra of 
her fundamental right to privacy, she should be able to have the procedure done without 
governmental interference.52  The Supreme Court agreed.53  Therefore, the right to privacy must 
not be confused with the right to conduct the named activity.  Rather, while there may be no 
specifically enumerated right to engage in this activity, penumbral protection is conferred upon 
the privacy to engage in this activity.  It is also worthy to note that although Source 
compensation has raised considerable controversy among opponents, it pales in comparison to 
the magnitude of controversy and publicity concerning abortion.  Logically then, the penumbra 
of privacy protecting abortion decisions from governmental intrusion should also extend to 
Source compensation.  As privacy is recognized as a fundamental right, opponents would thus be 
challenged with overcoming the strict scrutiny of the courts.
Furthermore, under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Contracts Clause prevents legislative 
acts from impairing the contractual relationship between parties, unless a sufficient 
governmental interest can be shown.54  Thus, between Griswold and Roe and their progeny, 
combined with the Contracts Clause, Sources have constitutional rights to be free from 
governmental intrusions into their private activities, and into their rights to contract.  In other 
words, Sources should have the same penumbral right to privacy and to personal autonomy to 
enter into contractual relationships to exchange body parts for consideration without 
governmental intrusion.  Prohibitions restricting the freedom to contract, as guaranteed by the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are subject to the lowest level of scrutiny—as 
long as the government has a legitimate objective which bears a rational relationship to the 
means chosen to achieve that goal, that prohibition will be upheld.  
52 Id.
53 Id.
54
   Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518, 643 (1819).
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While the government may oppose transactions involving body parts in exchange for 
consideration by arguing that it has an interest in guarding the health of the public, it is the 
researchers’ and physicians’ conduct that should be regulated, not that of the Source.  For 
instance, the quality of the scientist’s disclosure to potential Sources should be evaluated for 
quality and adherence to standard protocol.  Regulating the disclosure scientists must give and 
prohibiting concealment of material information from Sources would account for guarding the 
health of the public, who have the right of privacy to choose a plan of action in their own best 
interest.  Another example would be in imposing greater accountability upon scientists to 
maintain accurate records of whose body parts contributed to which discoveries.  As will be 
discussed infra, the administrative demand upon scientists is no more demanding than those 
already encountered on a regular basis.  In addition, researchers and physicians are the ones with 
extensive knowledge of their experiments and the consequences of participation, so the 
government should hold them to a higher standard of conduct.  The Source, lacking the 
specialized education and inside information about the experiments, is in a more vulnerable 
position.  In guarding the health of the public, the government further ought to protect Sources 
from scientists who do not adhere to proper disclosure protocol.
The government may further oppose Source compensation under the guise of protecting 
the morals of society.  However, while the Constitution protects the interests of the public, it 
should neither dictate nor enforce the public’s morals or beliefs.55  Moreover, there has been 
backlash against laws promoting social morals.  For example, in 1998, a U.S. Commissioner 
declared that the Patent and Trademark Office would reject biotechnology patents that were 
55
   Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1958) (holding that “the Constitution is not the formulation of the merely 
personal views of the members of this Court, nor can its authority be reduced to the claim that state officials are its 
controlling interpreters.”).
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“injurious to the well-being, good policy, or good morals of society.”56  Not only was the 
Commissioner attacked for presuming authority to enforce such prohibitions, but the statement 
launched public outcry against prohibitions on biotechnology grounded on moral arguments.57
Source compensation is a practice that should be afforded the highest constitutional 
protection as a fundamental right of privacy, in addition to constitutionally protecting Sources’ 
right to contract as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and the Due Process Clause.  
Furthermore, the government guards the interests of its citizens by supporting and enforcing 
Source compensation.
The Value of Body Parts
Biotechnology in the United States is a multi-billion dollar industry.58  In recent years, 
disagreements arise as to the exact numbers, but to place the value in context, in 1984, 
periodicals in the biotechnology industry predicted a potential market for a specific type of white 
blood cells at over $3 billion dollars by 1990.59  Another example reflecting the magnitude of 
wealth invested in biotechnology is the National budget.  The National Institute of Health (NIH) 
is but one of seven agencies controlled by the Department of Health and Human Services.60  Yet 
in 2004, the President’s budget for the NIH was $27.9 billion.61  Considering the numerous fields 
of research, most of which being associated with public, private, and corporate contributions, 
biotechnology can be considered one of the most profitable industries.  That is, except for 
Sources who, under current law, legislative acts, and practices, are not being fairly compensated 
for their contribution.
56
   Meredith Wadman, . . . As U.S. Office Claims Right to Rule on Morality, 393 Nature 200 (1998).
57
   David Dickson, Legal Fight Looms Over Patent Bid on Human/Animal Chimeras, 392 Nature 423 (1998).
58
   William Boulier, Sperm, Spleens, and Other Valuables:  The Need to Recognize Property Rights in Human Body 
Parts, 23 Hofstra L. Rev. 693, 694 (1995).
59 Moore, 793 P.2d at 482.
60 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National Institute of Health, at
http://nih.gov/,aboutNHI,NHIoverview (last visited Mar. 20, 2004).
61
   National Institutes of Health, Summary of the FY 2004 President’s Budget (Feb. 3, 2003).
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The public’s ignorance as to the value of the human body in research allows Sources to 
be financially and physically exploited.  Body parts have value to the scientific community both 
as a tool to conduct research, and financially, as the final product of the research.  For the public 
to understand the value of human parts in medical research, they must first appreciate the crucial 
role body parts plays in biotechnology:  without body parts from Sources, most medical progress 
would be severely hampered, if progression occurs at all.  In 1987, 49% of researchers at medical 
institutions depended on Source body parts in their work.62  Until it becomes possible to 
manufacture body parts in artificial laboratory settings, human Sources are a dire necessity.  
Ignorant of their enormous bargaining power, Sources generally donate, trusting that 
their body parts are a gift to be used to better mankind.  However, this trust in researchers and 
doctors could ultimately break down if Sources were to learn that these scientists turn around 
and profit from these gifts.  A case in point is blood banks, where Sources give blood without 
compensation.  Blood banks are then permitted to sell the blood to hospitals and research 
facilities for a profit, under the guise of either “selling a service” or “compensating the clinic for 
costs.”63
Another obstacle preventing public appreciation for the value of human body parts in 
medical research is the propagated belief that body parts should only be afforded dignitary value, 
rather than commercial value.  While it is a respectable view, it is also an archaic position.  As 
society, technology, and the human condition progress, notions of acceptable and unacceptable 
practices are challenged.  For instance, surrogate motherhood today is a common option that is 
62
   U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, supra, at Ch.1 pg. 8.
63 See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 19(a)-280 (West 1997); Del. Gen. Stat. Ann.. tit. 6, § 2-316(5) (2000); Fla. 
Stat. Ann. § 672.316(5) (West 2002)
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gaining acceptance, while such an avenue was shunned, or considered a last resort just a few 
decades ago.64
Similarly, Source compensation is a budding issue pressing for resolution.  Scandalous 
incidents over recent decades herald the inevitable:  body parts can command a huge price tag.  
For example, college students are commonly compensated financially for providing both 
regenerative65 and non-regenerative66 body parts.  In 2004, the University of California at Los 
Angeles became entangled in a legal web for allegedly selling donated cadavers to prominent 
pharmaceutical companies.67  Finally, and most horrifying, are the overseas reports of organs 
being stolen from the living to be sold on the international black market.68
These examples clearly repudiate the notion that body parts are of no value.  Evidently, 
biotechnology has transformed the traditional notions of the body “from merely a source of 
labor, or food for worms, to a highly prized biological commodity.”69  If anything, allowing 
compensation for a valuable contribution validates the Source’s dignity by giving him an 
enforceable stake in the research.70  Nonetheless, the public’s perception of the human body’s 
commercial value is but one obstacle to overcome in securing compensation for Sources.  Not 
64 See, e.g., Iris Leibowitz-Dori, Womb for Rent:  The Future of International Trade in Surrogacy, 6 Minn. J. 
Global Trade, 329, 341 (1997) (commenting on the growing popularity of surrogacy as its publicity increases); see 
also, Lisa L. Behm, Legal, Moral, & International Perspectives on Surrogate Motherhood, 2 DePaul J. Health Care 
L. 557, 558 (1999); Christine L. Kerian, Surrogacy:  A Last Resort Alternative for Infertile Women, or a 
Commodification of Women’s Bodies and Children?, 12 Wis. Women’s L.J. 113, 116 (1997).
65 See, e.g., Kenneth Baum, Golden Eggs:  Towards the Rational Regulation of Oocyte Donation, 2001 B.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 107 (2001) (compensating college students for sperm and ova).
66
   Comment, Tax Consequences of Transfers of Bodily Parts, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 842, 845 n.21 (1973) 
(compensating college student for parts of thigh muscle).
67
   Robert Jablon, Demand Spurs Virtually Unregulated Trade in Cadavers; UCLA Stops Accepting Bodies During 
Probe, Mar. 10, 2004, at
http://www.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2004/03/11/scandal_at_ucla_reveals_cadaver_trade_as_big_
business/  (last visited April 24, 2006).
68 See, e.g., Hugh O’Shaughnessy, Murder and Mutilation Supply Human Organ Trade, The Observer, Mar. 27, 
1994, at 27 (disappearing Russian orphans); Charles P. Wallace, For Sale:  The Poor’s Body Parts, L.A. Times, 
Aug. 27, 1992, at A1 (kidnapping for kidneys in India).
69
   Michale H. Scarmon, Property Rights in the Human Body—Are the Goods Oft Interred with Their Bones, 37 
S.D. L. Rev. 429 (1992).
70
   William Boulier, 23 Hofstra L. Rev. at 719.
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only does legislation fail to protect Sources, but because the government is the primary source of 
funding,71 then indirectly, the government will continue to promote Source exploitation by 
supporting the biotechnology industry.
The Source Shareholder Solution
Source compensation proponents have proposed a multitude of solutions.  Pennsylvania 
has launched a pilot program to compensate the Source for reasonable funeral expenses upon his 
death.72  Other supporters have suggested granting Sources official property rights in their 
bodies.73  Still other proponents recommend offering tax incentives.74  This article, however, 
proposes another solution.
The Source Shareholder solution attempts to combat the evils of exploitation from both 
sides:  preventing Sources from demanding compensation from scientists whose research has not 
yet earned capital, and preventing scientists from ignoring the Sources’ contribution.  The 
Source Shareholder solution is modeled after the shareholder system used by corporations, and is 
intended to spread the wealth from the industry to all contributors, including Sources.
The mechanism of compensation is simple.  After a researcher obtains the body part, the 
Source would retain a percent (or fraction of) interest in the researcher’s final product.  This 
interest would be akin to a share of stock.  If the researcher’s final product is profitable, that 
Source has the choice to either “cash in” his stock, thereby selling his interest back to the 
researcher, or to hold on to the interest, such that as profit presumably accrues over time, the 
Source’s share would increase in value.
71
   U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, supra, at 7.
72
   Laurel R. Siegel, Re-engineering the Laws of Organ Transplantation, 49 Emory L.J. 917 (2000).
73 See, e.g., Roy Hardiman, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 207; Emily Denham Morris, The Organ Trail:  Express Versus 
Presumed Consent as Paths to Blaze in Solving a Critical Shortage, 90 Ky. L.J. 1125 (2002); Id.
74 See, e.g., Frederick R. Parker, Jr. et al., Organ Procurement & Tax Policy, 2 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol’y 173 
(2002).
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As a scientist’s research progresses and more shares are needed for additional Sources, a 
stock-split can occur, thus ensuring earlier Sources will be proportionately compensated, while 
enabling newer Sources to be compensated as well.  
The obstacles to this solution, of course, would be to gain legislative support for such a 
system.  A system of good faith dealing would also be required between the researcher and the 
Source.75  Moreover, Sources would need to be guarded against fraud and deception.  However, 
building on established shareholder principles, and on practices already accepted in society that 
are similar to Source compensation, the Source Shareholder system could prove to be a 
successful means to compensate Sources proportional to their contribution, spread the wealth in 
technology to society, and avoid the evils of selling body parts.
Source Compensation:  Public Policies and Ethical Issues
No Exploitation of the Poor
Opponents of Source compensation are concerned with exploitation of the poor.76
However, this would only occur if they were induced with rags-to-riches promises.  Particularly 
with the Source Shareholder solution, this is not the case, for a number of reasons.
First, the amount of compensation will be dictated by market mechanisms of supply and 
demand.  Until body parts can be manufactured in laboratories to meet educational, research, and 
transplant needs, the lucrative market for human body parts will continue.  Offering financial 
incentives will increase the number of willing Sources.  With the pressure of demand eased, 
Sources will bargain for less consideration in order to stay competitive.  Thus, unless the Source 
75
   This system would prevent, for example, circumstances where Sources’ shares are only worth pennies while the 
enormous profit still ends up in the researcher’s pocket.
76 See, e.g., Roy Hardiman, Toward the Right of Commerciality:  Recognizing Property Rights in the Commercial 
Value of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 207 (1986).
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possessed a rare characteristic, he would not be in a position to bargain for unreasonably high 
figures.  
Second, under this model of compensation, potential Sources are informed that there is a 
possibility that they will not be compensated at all, if the research is not profitable.  In addition, 
it is likely that it would take a long time for a profitable scientific discovery to accumulate 
wealth.  Therefore, even if impoverished Sources were to invest their body parts, presumably, 
they would sell their share soon after it becomes profitable to gain immediate reward.  The 
prospect of long-term financial return, if any, thus serves to deter the poor from providing body 
parts for money.  Compensation is meant to be just that—compensation is not a livelihood.
Third, it is unlikely that compensation received for body parts will create overnight 
millionaires.  The premise of compensation is that Sources take only a share of profits, and it is 
proportionate to contribution.  Thus, if the contribution is small, it could be reasonable for a 
Source to agree to only a fraction of a percent of the researcher’s profits.  While some 
biotechnology discoveries have become enormously profitable, most are only moderately so.  
Furthermore, it is entirely possible that the research is altogether fruitless—without the 
researcher profiting, the Source cannot profit either.  This prospect will likely deter those 
dreaming of wealth by simply providing body parts.  In fact, an advantage of this system is that it 
encourages education and public awareness of medical advances.  Coupled with the researcher’s 
full disclosure, a potential Source may decide that the venture is not promising enough to invest 
his body parts.  Thus, Sources who educate themselves about biotechnology and research 
advances are the ones most likely to be compensated.
Fourth, it should be of little concern that substance abusers would resort to becoming a 
Source to generate income to support their habits.  The obvious and unfortunate effect of 
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substance abuse is the self-destructive toll it takes on the body.  Damaged or diseased body parts 
likely will have little value for research.  Additionally, having already established many of the 
detrimental effects of substance abuse, the body parts of substance abusers likely will be unfit for 
any profitable use.
No Effect on Cost to the Consuming Public
Concerns regarding Source compensation increasing costs to the consuming public are 
also unfounded.77  Again, the premise is that Source compensation is derived from post-
consumer profits.  Thus, normal increases in pre-consumer costs, for example, in marketing or 
transporting the product, would have larger effects on the public.  Further, even Congress’ 
reports state:  “actual compensation to the human sources of original tissues and cells is unlikely 
to have a large economic impact on the use of human biological materials.”78
Opponents also argue that because researchers often share work and findings, that having 
to compensate Sources would interfere with a “free” trade of information.79  Further, they 
contend that if researchers were to share body parts or derivatives of body parts, keeping detailed 
records of Sources’ origins to adequately compensate them would be unduly burdensome.80
These concerns are exaggerations.  Given, additional record-keeping will be inevitable to ensure 
Source compensation, but researchers already maintain meticulous records of medical histories 
and background information on Sources, in order to control their experiments for anomalous 
results.81  Furthermore, the administrative effort for keeping track of whose body parts 
contributed to which products is no more demanding than the work physicians routinely 
encounter with respect to organizing insurance or alternative billing arrangements.  As far as 
77 See, e.g., U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, supra.
78 See, id., at Ch.1 pg. 13.
79 Id. 
80 Id.
81 See Roy Hardiman, 34 UCLA L. Rev. at 241.
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interfering with the “free” trade of information, researchers often credit each other for providing 
equipment, tools, and other resources that required financial or intellectual investment.  Body 
parts are no different, especially since the original researcher expends no finances to compensate 
the Source until a derivative product proves profitable.  From there, patents guard fierce financial 
competition between researchers.
Strengthens Self-Concept and Physician-Patient Relationship
As discussed, the Source places confidence in the physician-patient relationship.  Full 
disclosure of material information relevant to the treatment or research, including economic 
potential, is essential to the trust Sources place in their physician.  For a doctor to be bound by 
Hippocratic Oath to disclose personal research interests that may conflict with his professional 
judgment strengthens the Source’s faith in the physician-patient relationship.  Inherent in that 
disclosure is also potential risks to Sources, should they partake in research activities.  Thus, it is 
ultimately up to the researcher or physician to prevent Sources from endangering their health.  
This judgment call is akin to those made in every physician-patient transaction.  As such, a 
breach of this duty subjects the physician or researcher to sanctions.
Despite the informed consent requirements, Source compensation opponents posture that 
although not endangering health, society could be plagued with disfigured people who sought 
compensation.82  This issue is unfounded and far-fetched.  As discussed supra, compensation 
does not promise wealth; in fact, if the research proves fruitless, Sources will not be 
compensated at all.  Thus, it is unlikely that society will be driven to disfigurement on those 
grounds.  Also, this argument promotes the attitude that the disfigured or disabled are lesser 
individuals.  There are a multitude of disabled or disfigured individuals who are contributing, 
82 See, e.g., Michelle Bourianoff Bray, Personalizing Personalty:  Toward a Property Right in Human Bodies, 69 
Tex. L. Rev. 209 (1990).
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productive members of society.  For instance, despite losing a leg to cancer, Terry Fox ran over 
3,300 miles in 143 days across Canada to raise money for cancer research before succumbing to 
the disease.83  Other examples include members of the Association of Mouth and Foot Painting 
Artists (who, as the name suggests, create paintings by using only their mouth or foot because 
their hands are unable to do so84), and Erik Weihenmayer (who became the first blind person to 
climb Mt. Everest85).  Loss of a physical body part cannot be equated with the loss of identity or 
self-worth.  The suggestion that vanity-controlled self-esteem issues could result from Source 
compensation is no more than speculation and a superficial presumption that does not support a 
public policy argument.
The Protection of Individual Autonomy—The Fairness Argument
Permitting Sources to be compensated proportional to their contributions to science is 
consistent with traditional concepts of commercial fairness.  It protects their individual 
autonomy by giving them an enforceable interest.  Furthermore, it prevents a profitable industry, 
which still receives extraordinary financial support from the outside, from unjustly enriching 
themselves with the exclusive benefit of the Source’s body parts.  Scientists wrongfully persuade 
Sources from many angles to unconditionally provide body parts.  For instance, Sources are 
often told that removal of harmful tissues or organs is in itself a form of compensation, and that 
the scientists should be able to keep the offending body part in consideration for its removal.86
This scenario extends to experiments involving placebos, such that the Source may not be 
receiving much more than a sugar pill, whereas the researcher gains valuable scientific data.  
83
   The Terry Fox Foundation, at http://www.terryfoxrun.org/english/about%20terry%20fox/default.asp?s=1 (last 
visited Apr. 24, 2006).
84
   AMFPA—Association of Mouth and Foot Painting Artists, at
http://www.aapbp.com/html/show.php?lang=2&mid=100&oid=943 (last visited Apr. 24, 2006).
85
   Prove Them Wrong, at www.provethemwrong.com/weihenmayer.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2006).
86 See U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, supra, at Ch.1 pg. 12.
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However, these persuasions confuse the “benefit of treatment” with the “benefit of being 
compensated for contributing to a profitable research project.”
Sources have also been told that replenishable body parts, such as blood, are useless to a 
Source once it has been extracted.87  Despite the “uselessness” to the Source, that does not mean 
that the extraction is of no value.  On one hand, if not for the scientist’s intervention, the body 
parts have no independent value, but on the other hand, if not for the Source’s contribution, the 
scientist would not have had the means to achieve his profitable results.  Source compensation is 
not meant to drain financial resources from fledgling research projects.  It seeks to dissolve the 
inequity of full reward to the researcher, while ignoring the Source’s contribution. 
Thus, these positions are no more than arguments used to persuade the Source to give 
away their body parts—in essence, removing the Source’s bargaining power in an attempt to 
steal what is already free.  Basically, by robbing body parts, researchers rob Sources of personal 
autonomy.  Returning to Hecht, the court went further than simply recognition of Kane’s wishes 
to devise his sperm to his girlfriend; it recognized the autonomy to control the purpose of one’s 
body parts or choose the circumstances around their use.  This decision recognizes and enforces 
rights critical to preserving personal autonomy over one’s body.  Thus, regardless of the burden 
on the industry, it is a stronger policy interest to uphold equity and protect Sources from physical 
and financial exploitation.
Familiar Models in Society
While Source compensation is not yet an available option, other accepted practices in 
society suggest that it could and should be adopted.  For instance, employees in certain trades 
who lose body parts during the scope of employment often receive disability benefits through 
workers’ compensation plans.  The loss or injury of a specific body part determines particular 
87 Id. 
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payment schedules.88  Thus, there is an objective appreciation that body parts have inherent 
economic value, and furthermore, that different body parts have different values.  Since 
employment contracts are generally economic compensation in consideration for labor, workers’ 
compensation recognizes the inequity of an employee putting his body at risk so an employer 
may continue to profit, and compensates employees for lost body parts in the line of duty.   It 
places the economic burden of lost body parts on the party more capable of bearing that burden, 
and compensates the contribution (and at this point, the sacrifice) of the employee.  The premise 
is similar to Source compensation in medical research, where the amount of compensation is 
determined by the body part’s value to both the researcher and the Source.  Additionally, under 
both workers’ compensation and Source compensation, the economic benefit is not meant to 
create wealth.
The field of reproductive health has already established policies to compensate Sources 
for eggs, sperm, and even embryos, albeit not for the body parts per se.  With the advent of 
reproductive technology becoming safer and more successful, couples who were previously 
unable to conceive have opened their pocketbooks to Sources for precious live-giving cells.  
Traditionally, female Sources providing eggs have been compensated between $1,000 - $5,000 
for their inconvenience, but in 2001, reports of compensation of $50,000 were not surprising.89
Yet, in a similar context, male sources providing sperm are generally only compensated $50.90
Though economic value in these cases is not determined by profits derived from their body parts, 
Sources are at least compensated for the emotional value of the body parts.
88 See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.. § 23-1044(b) (West Supp.1989); Colo. Rev. Stat. §  8-51-104 (1986); Pa. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 77, § 513(Purdon Supp. 1989).
89 See generally,Kenneth Baum, 2001 B.Y.U. L. Rev. at 108-109.
90
   Interview with Evan E. Follas, General Manager of Follas Laboratories Inc., Indianapolis (Nov. 12, 1991).
- 26 -
The high price tag for providing life-giving cells is not limited to provision of gametes.  
In some states, surrogate mothers may be compensated for expenses beyond those related to 
pregnancy.91  Similarly, private adoption92 has recently gained acceptance.  However, even then 
it is often difficult to distinguish between expense reimbursement and compensation unrelated to 
the pregnancy.93  It would be naïve to believe that economic transactions were strictly limited to 
reimbursement; yet neither legislature nor the common law has distinguished between them, 
arguably because compensation to the birth mother has been deemed “equitable.”
The movement toward Source compensation is evident in the recent mimicking of 
surrogate compensation.  Furthermore, in 2004, the White House overwhelmingly passed a bill 
to reimburse organ donors for travel and non-medical expenses.94  Although the legislation is 
specifically for Sources providing body parts for transplant surgery, it is a reflection upon 
shifting governmental appreciation for the value of Sources in biotechnology.
Public and media opposition against Source compensation for non-reproductive body 
parts is small compared to opposition against compensation in more sensitive areas, such as 
reproductive body parts, use of body parts for gestation, or even adoption.  Yet, there are a 
growing number of examples of compensation for these sensitive areas.  It follows then, that if 
society and the law accepts compensation as equitable in these circumstances, then certainly 
where non-reproductive body parts are concerned, Source compensation should be accepted as 
well.
91 See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
92
   Private adoption is where the birth mother is compensated for expenses incurred during the pregnancy, and 
payments to any intermediaries are limited to costs for professional services.  Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of 
Family Law, 1992 Wis. L. Rev.1443, 1483-84 (1992).
93 See, e.g., James B. Boskey, Placing Children for Adoption, in Adoption Law & Practice, (Joan H. Hollinger ed. 
1992), at p. 3-1, p. 3-6.
94
 Aparna H. Kumar, House OKs Funding to Spur Organ Donations, Mar. 24, 2004, at
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/health/20040324-1116- organdonation.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2004).
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Conclusion
It is undisputed in the biotechnology industry that human body parts play a vital role in 
research.  Forbidding the explosion of profits from trickling down to the Source presents an 
irrational inequity.  Despite established law, it is evident from case analysis and prevailing social 
practices that Source compensation is a plausible solution.  As long as Sources provide informed 
consent to have their body parts extracted for research purposes, compensating them for 
contributions to a profitable venture promotes faith in the physician-patient relationship and 
fosters individual autonomy.  Furthermore, Sources have a right of privacy, and their 
compensation is a practice that should be protected under the Constitution.
While opponents cite reasons ranging from economics to ethics, the advantages of Source 
compensation outweigh the setbacks.  Sources’ financial rewards are likely miniscule compared 
to those of the scientist, assuming that there are profits to split at all.  Additionally, the Source 
Shareholder solution minimizes public policy concerns by promoting Source education and 
preventing the exploitation of the poor.
Attitudes centered around vanity are exchanged for views that the human body is 
valuable, and has intrinsic economic worth.  In the face of opposition, a slow-reacting judicial 
system, and persistent archaic attitudes, the future of Source compensation is uncertain, but 
recent governmental and societal progress is promising—“If there is no struggle, there is no 
progress.”95
95
   Frederick Douglass, Speech at Canandaigua, New York (Aug. 3, 1857).
